Amazon met Alexa au micro-ondes

Germany was mortally wounded. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped fromtons in April to 30, tons in July and 5, tons in September, rencontre 21400. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a rencontre 21400 one. In the field of strategic intelligence, there was an important need for further and more rencontre 21400 information, especially before and during the early phases of the war. Although the testimony on the point is conflicting, the Jaegerstab may have sacrificed quality and an adequate complement of spare parts, for quantity production. One of these, Opel at Brandenburg, was knocked out completely in one raid on August 6,rencontre 21400, and did not recover.

The Table of Organization provided for civilians, officers and enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and established forward headquarters and regional headquarters in Germany immediately following the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary material, including top German government documents; and conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans, including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders.

Germany was scoured for its war records, which were found sometimes, but rarely, in places where they ought to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in a hen house and, on two occasions, in coffins.

Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey. Some two hundred detailed reports were made, including an Over-all Report, of which this is a summary. During the course of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and suggestions in connection with the air operations against Japan. While the European War was going on, it was necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irretrievably lost.

Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed. The Survey is now studying the effects of the air attack on Japan. When that study is completed further reports will be submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Air power in the last war was in its infancy. The new role of three-dimensional warfare was even then foreseen by a few farsighted men, but planes were insufficient in quality and quantity to permit much more than occasional brilliant assistance to the ground forces.

Air power in the European phase of this war reached a stage of full adolescence, a stage marked by rapid development in planes, armament, equipment, tactics and concepts of strategic employment, and by an extraordinary increase in the effort allocated to it by all the major contestants. England devoted 40 to 50 percent of her war production to her air forces, Germany 40 percent, and the United States 35 percent. Nevertheless, at the end of hostilities in Europe, weapons, tactics and strategy were still in a state of rapid development.

Air power had not yet reached maturity and all conclusions drawn from experience in the European theatre must be considered subject to change. No one should assume that because certain things were effective or not effective, the same would be true under other circumstances and other conditions. In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,, tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,, bomber sorties and 2,, fighter sorties were flown. The number of combat planes reached a peak of some 28, and at the maximum 1,, men were in combat commands.

The number of men lost in air action was 79, Americans and 79, British. All RAF statistics are preliminary or tentative. In the wake of these attacks there are great paths of destruction. Survey estimates show some , civilians killed and , wounded. The number made homeless aggregates 7,, The principal German cities have been largely reduced to hollow walls and piles of rubble.

German industry is bruised and temporarily paralyzed. These are the scars across the face of the enemy, the preface to the victory that followed. How air supremacy was achieved and the results which followed from its exploitation are the subject of this summary report. The use of air power cannot properly be considered, however, except in conjunction with the broad plans and strategy under which the war was conducted. Time and timing were the secret weapons in the German war plan that took shape after By rapid mobilization of a powerful striking force, by exploiting the political and ideological strains that he conceived to exist in the rest of the world, and by overwhelming separately in lightning campaigns such of his enemies as chose to resist, he hoped to secure for Germany an invulnerable position in Europe and in the world.

What Germany lacked in numbers of divisions, in raw materials and in basic industrial strength, it planned to compensate with highly trained Page 2 ground units of great striking power. Essential in this strategy was a technically well-developed air force in being. The air force was, primarily, an arm of the blitzkrieg. And by common report of the surviving Nazi leaders even the setback over Britain was considered of minor importance.

There would be time thereafter, if necessary, to deal with Britain. By September Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cut-backs in war production. The German War Economy Study of German war production data as well as interrogation of those who were in charge of rearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that until the defeat at Moscow German industry was incompletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did not foresee the need for full economic mobilization.

German arms production during and was generally below that of Britain. When the full meaning of the reverses at Moscow became apparent the German leaders called for all-out production. Great reserves of foreign labor only awaited voluntary or forced recruitment. After the defeat at Moscow early in , armament production increased rapidly. However, such increase was more the result of improvements in industrial efficiency than of general economic mobilization.

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women less than in the first war were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards.

Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years.

An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient.

These helped cushion the people of the German cities from the effects of bombing. Plant and machinery were plentiful and incompletely used. Thus it was comparatively easy to substitute unused or partly used machinery for that which was destroyed. While there was constant pressure throughout for German manpower for the Wehrmacht, the industrial labor supply, as augmented by foreign labor, was sufficient to permit the diversion of large numbers to the repair of bomb damage or the clearance of debris with relatively small sacrifice of essential production.

This view, however, was not controlling in the overall Allied strategic plan. The dominant element in that plan was invasion of the Continent to occur in the spring of The deployment of the air forces opposing Germany was heavily influenced by the fact that victory was planned to come through invasion and land occupation.

In the early years of the war, to be sure, the RAF had the independent mission of striking at German industrial centers in an effort to weaken the German economy and the morale of the German people.

However, the weight of the RAF effort, compared with tonnages later employed, was very small , tons in and Soon after the United States entered the air war in , replacements for the new and still small Eighth Air Force were diverted to support the North African invasion. During , target selection for the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force based on the Mediterranean reckoned always with the fact that maximum contribution must be made to the invasion in the coming year.

And the Ninth Air Force in Western Europe and the Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean were developed with the primary mission of securing the sky in the theatre of combat and clearing the way for ground operations.

In the spring and early summer of , all air forces based on England were used to prepare the way for the invasion. It was not intended that the air attacks against Germany proper and the German economy would be a subordinate operation, but rather a part of a larger strategic plan -- one that contemplated that the decision would come through the advance of ground armies rather than through air power alone. The RAF experimented briefly in with daylight attacks on industrial targets in Germany but abandoned the effort when losses proved unbearably heavy.

Thereafter, it attempted to find and attack such targets as oil, aluminum and aircraft plants at night. This effort too was abandoned; with available techniques it was not possible to locate the targets often enough. Then the RAF began its famous raids on German urban and industrial centers. On the night of May 30, , it mounted its first "thousand plane" raid against Cologne and two nights later struck Essen with almost equal force. On three nights in late July and early August it struck Hamburg in perhaps the most devastating single city attack of the war -- about one third of the houses of the city were destroyed and German estimates show 60, to , people killed.

No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from interrogation of high officials that Hitler himself thought that further attacks of similar weight might force Germany out of the war. The RAF proceeded to destroy one major urban center after another. Except in the extreme eastern part of the Reich, there is no major city that does not bear the mark of these attacks.

However, no subsequent attack had the shock effect of the Hamburg raid. In the latter half of , aided by new navigational techniques, the RAF returned with part of its force to an attack on industrial targets. These attacks were notably successful but it is with the attacks on urban areas that the RAF is most prominently identified.

The city attacks of the RAF prior to the autumn of , did not substantially affect the course of German war production. German war production as a whole continued to increase. This in itself is not conclusive, but the Survey has made detailed analysis of the course of production and trade in 10 German cities that were attacked during this Page 4 period and has made more general analyses in others. These show that while production received a moderate setback after a raid, it recovered substantially within a relatively few weeks.

As a rule the industrial plants were located around the perimeter of German cities and characteristically these were relatively undamaged. Commencing in the autumn of , the tonnage dropped on city areas, plus spill-overs from attacks on transportation and other specific targets, mounted greatly.

There were so many forces making for the collapse of production during this period, however, that it is not possible separately to assess the effect of these later area raids on war production. There is no doubt, however, that they were significant. The Survey has made extensive studies of the reaction of the German people to the air attack and especially to city raids.

These studies were carefully designed to cover a complete cross section of the German people in western and southern Germany and to reflect with a minimum of bias their attitude and behavior during the raids. These studies show that the morale of the German people deteriorated under aerial attack. The night raids were feared far more than daylight raids.

The people lost faith in the prospect of victory, in their leaders and in the promises and propaganda to which they were subjected. Most of all, they wanted the war to end. If they had been at liberty to vote themselves out of the war, they would have done so well before the final surrender.

In a determined police state, however, there is a wide difference between dissatisfaction and expressed opposition. Although examination of official records and those of individual plants shows that absenteeism increased and productivity diminished somewhat in the late stages of the war, by and large workers continued to work. However dissatisfied they were with the war, the German people lacked either the will or the means to make their dissatisfaction evident.

The city area raids have left their mark on the German people as well as on their cities. Far more than any other military action that preceded the actual occupation of Germany itself, these attacks left the German people with a solid lesson in the disadvantages of war. It was a terrible lesson; conceivably that lesson, both in Germany and abroad, could be the most lasting single effect of the air war. Army Air Forces entered the European war with the firm view that specific industries and services were the most promising targets in the enemy economy, and they believed that if these targets were to be hit accurately, the attacks had to be made in daylight.

A word needs to be said on the problem of accuracy in attack. Before the war, the U.

Bitumage de la route Koundougou–Solenzo: Le leve topographique a commence mercredi 12 septembre Le leve topographique des travaux de bitumage de la route Koundougou–Solenzo, dont le lancement est prevu pour fin , a demarre le dimanche 9 septembre , a partir de Koundougou. nous vous declinons quelques uns de nos fournisseurs en beaujolais rouge, beaujolais blanc et beaujolais rose, beaujolais village, notre cru du beaujolais:le morgon, quelques crus du beaujolais et nos cremants de bourgogne, que ce .

Total 1 comments.
#1 13.08.2018 â 16:13 Ilyamix:
Author humorist